ANALYSIS OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIORIN IN PREPARATION OF BUDGET

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Abstract

Good local governance is the most prominent issue in the management of public administration today. Parliament is supposed to control the running of the government to keep it in accordance with the aspirations of the people, not the other way damage and Executive condition to perform deviations against the rules - the rules, collusion in the budget-making in order to benefit themselves, as well as any activity that should be used to control the executive, quite the contrary is used as an opportunity to "squeeze" the executive so that executives become more focused attention to spoil legislators compared with the whole community. So the problems that occur are usually based on the interests of each individual that impact on the emergence of agency problems between the parties. The budget approved by the legislature and then held accountable to the executive and the legislature. In this context, it can be said that the relationship between the legislature and the executive in the implementation of the budget is the executive and the legislature as a principal agent. This will impact on the opportunistic behavior of the parties involved in the preparation of the budget, especially legislators. Legislative opportunistic behavior can be brought on due to political corruption and moral hazard in the executive, legislative conduct of political corruption through the realization of its discretionary power in budgeting.

Keywords: Opportunistic, Legislative and Budget

1.1 Introduction

As the wave of regional autonomy, there are some changes in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. First, the joint executive board has full autonomy to make local policies; and second, the board members have full autonomy and have a great chance in the legislative process. The authority of the board in making policy is not limited only to elect the head of the region, but also the authority to make laws, surveillance, investigation, and together with the executive preparing the budget that had not previously been done. Another implication of regional autonomy is the transfer of these funds coupled with the implementation of budgetary reform and reform of the financial accounting system area (Halim, 2003). Budgeting reforms that happened was the emergence of a new paradigm in the preparation of the budget that the principle of public accountability, participation, and transparency of the budget. In addition, the budget must be managed with the approach of performance (performance oriented), the principle of efficient and effective (Value For Money), justice and prosperity, and in accordance with budgetary discipline (Mardiasmo, 2003).

Regional autonomy policy in Indonesia has brought a fundamental change in the relationship Local Government (executive) with the Regional Representatives Council (DPRD) or the legislature, where the legislature elects and dismiss the head area. This shows that in the legislative and executive happen agency relationship (Halim, 2002; Halim & Abdullah, 2006). This change also has implications for increasing the role of the legislature in public policy making, including budgeting.

Since Parliament has no authority in budgeting are changing conditions cause many problems. First, the budget transfer system is not clear from the center to the regions. Second, because of time constraints often overlooked people's participation. Third, the essence of autonomy in budgeting is twisted by the central government for autonomous management of revenue sources while still controlled by the central shopping area is only magnified portion. Fourth, it turns out wherever Parliament has difficulty to perform the assessment of priority needs of the people who should take precedence in the budget. Fifth, the volume of the budget prepared by the region increased by 80% compared to the new order, this is problematic because some measure of Parliament and local governments need to work harder to draw up the budget. Sixth, although it still has to go through the central government, but thegovernment, according to Law No. 25 of 1999 has the authority to make loans to the region both domestically and abroad.

Changing conditions above trigger some tendencies. First, the presence of local government jargon that is so powerful to increase revenue (the original income) in the framework of regional autonomy. Thus,